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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2a-3(2)(a) and (j), and Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This appeal is taken 
from an Order of the Utah Labor Commission denying RESPONDENTS' Motion for Review, 
which was then appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1.) Whether the "coming and going" doctrine is applicable to the facts in this case. The 
"coming and going" doctrine defines whether an employee injured on the way to or coming from 
work is acting within the course and scope of employment. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Whether the "coming and going" doctrine applies to the 
facts of this case is a mixed question of law and fact and, as such, this Court reviews "a trial 
court's or agency's application of the law to the facts . . . with varying degrees of strictness, 
falling anywhere between a review of 'correctness' and a broad 'abuse of discretion' standard." 
Drake v. Industrial Commission, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997), quoting Langeland v. Monarch 
Motors, Inc., 307 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4, — P.2d —, — (Utah Dec. 31, 1996), citing State v. Pena, 
869 P.2d 932, 936-939 (Utah 1994). 
PRESERVATION ON APPEAL: On July 17, 2003, RESPONDENTS filed their 
Motion for Review with the Labor Commission. (Motion for Review, R. 44). RESPONDENTS 
argued that the Commission did not correctly apply the "coming and going" doctrine to the facts 
of this case and asked the Labor Commission to overturn Judge George's decision. 
(Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Respondent's Motion for Review, R. 47-56). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: PETITIONER filed an Application for Hearing requesting 
Temporary Total Disability Benefits from August 1, 2000 through June 11, 2001, Medical 
Expenses, Travel Expenses, and Interest. (Application for Hearing, R. 1). An accident occurred 
while PETITIONER was on his way to work. There is a question of whether the accident 
occurred within the course and scope of employment. 
Course of Proceedings: On June 11, 2001, at 10:00 a.m., a hearing was held before the 
Honorable Judge Donald L. George regarding the compensability of PETITIONER'S injuries and 
whether the accident occurred within the course and scope of PETITIONER'S employment. 
(Notice of Formal Hearing on Application for Adjustment of Claim, R. 16; Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order, R. 37-43). On June 6, 2003, Judge George issued a 
memorandum decision in which he found that PETITIONER'S automobile accident was an 
accident that arose out of the course and scope of employment and, therefore, was a compensable 
accident. (Memorandum Decision, R.32-34). Judge George then asked that Ms. K. Dawn Atkin, 
counsel for PETITIONER, draft the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and submit them 
to his office. (Memorandum Decision, R. 32-34). On June 17, 2003, Judge George issued his 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, ordering RESPONDENTS to pay temporary 
total benefits, past and future medical expenses, and attorney fees. (Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order, R. 37-43). 
On July 17, 2003, RESPONDENTS filed their Motion for Review with the Labor 
Commission. (Motion for Review, R. 44-46). RESPONDENTS argued that the Commission did 
not correctly apply the "coming and going" doctrine to the facts of this case and asked the Labor 
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Commission to overturn Judge George's decision. (Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Support of Respondents' Motion for Review, R. 47-56). 
On November 6, 2003, the Labor Commission entered its Order Denying Motion for 
Review and upheld Judge George's award of benefits as a compensable accident, ignoring the 
coming and going rule and holding that the accident occurred within the course and scope of 
PETITIONER'S employment. (Order Denying Motion for Review, R. 66-70). On December 1, 
2003, RESPONDENTS filed a Petition for Review with the Utah Court of Appeals. (Petition for 
Review, R. 71-72). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 1, 2000, PETITIONER was employed as an assistant manager by 
RESPONDENTS, a small company that sold hydro-massage products from kiosks located in 
Fashion Place, Cottonwood, and Crossroads malls. (Order Denying Motion for Review, R. 66). 
The Labor Commission found that as assistant manager, PETITIONER was expected to take 
whatever action was necessary to make RESPONDENTS' retail operations run smoothly. (Order 
Denying Motion for Review, R. 67). PETITIONER established employee work schedules and 
called employees from his home to verify they would report for work. (Order Denying Motion 
for Review, R. 67). Occasionally, PETITIONER worked at various sales kiosks himself, as 
necessary to cover for absent employees. (Order Denying Motion for Review, R. 67). 
PETITIONER collected employee time cards, tracked inventory, and collected and deposited 
sales receipts. (Order Denying Motion for Review, R. 67). The Labor Commission also 
determined that PETITIONER used his personal vehicle to deliver product he needed to deliver 
to the various mall locations on any given day. (Order Denying Motion for Review, R. 67). 
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On August 1, 2000, PETITIONER made an entry on his family home computer at 7:30 
a.m. (Order Denying Motion for Review, R. 67). PETITIONER was scheduled to work at a 
kiosk in Fashion Place Mall at 10:00 a.m. and was proceeding there when he was involved in a 
motor vehicle accident at 9:47 a.m. (Order Denying Motion for Review, R. 67). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Because on the morning of the accident PETITIONER was leaving for his regularly 
scheduled shift, PETITIONER was not within the course and scope of his employment. 
PETITIONER should be treated as any other employee who is leaving their home to begin 
working a shift for any employer. Although PETITIONER'S job description included delivering 
products from his home to various area mall locations, travel between mall locations, and other 
delivers such as deposit receipts, determining whether the PETITIONER was within the course 
and scope of employment is not based on a person's general duties. Instead, the Court must 
determine what the PETITIONER activities were on the morning of the accident and at the time 
of the accident. 
In this case, the PETITIONER'S general job duties required the use of his personal 
vehicle and travel between mall locations to deliver products. PETITIONER'S duty on the 
morning of the accident, at the time of his departure, was to open the kiosk in Fashion Place Mall 
for his regularly scheduled shift. RESPONDENTS had no control over PETITIONER while he 
traveled from his home to the Fashion Place Mall and received no benefit from his arrival at the 
kiosk. Consequently, the PETITIONER was not within the course and scope of his employment 
at the time of the accident and, therefore, benefits should be denied pursuant to the coming and 
going rule. 
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ARGUMENTS 
I. PETITIONER WAS ON HIS WAY TO COVER AN OPENING SHIFT AT 
THE FASHION PLACE MALL KIOSK AND, THEREFORE, THE GOING 
AND COMING APPLIES TO THE FACTS IN THIS CASE 
The Labor Commission (hereinafter referred to as the "Commission") ruled that the 
"coming and going" doctrine is "inapplicable when the travel which gives rise to the accident is 
an integral part of the work itself." (Order Denying Motion for Review, R. 68). Specifically, in 
denying RESPONDENTS' Motion for Review, the Commission determined that it was 
PETITIONER'S "duty to transport merchandise from his home to [RESPONDENTS'] store 
locations, to travel between the sales, locations, and to travel for other business purposes such as 
depositing sales receipts." (Order Denying Motion for Review, R. 68). Based upon these duties, 
the Commission found that PETITIONER'S "work-related travel was, therefore, the 'condition' 
out of which his accident and injury arose." (Order Denying Motion for Review, R. 68). 
Consequently, the Commission determined that PETITIONER'S injuries occurred within the 
course and scope of his employment and benefits should be paid. (Order Denying Motion for 
Review, R. 69). 
Furthermore, the Commission determined that PETITIONER'S "automobile accident 
occurred while he was rendering a service to his employer, or at the very least was engaged in an 
activity that was necessarily incidental to his employment." (Order Denying Motion for Review, 
R. 68). Accordingly, the Commission determined that PETITIONER'S injuries "arose out of and 
in the course of [PETITIONER'S] employment. . ." (Order Denying Motion for Review, R. 68). 
A review of the court-crafted coming and going rule, however, will show that the facts as 
presented in this case do not except the PETITIONER'S travel to the Fashion Place Mall from 
the traditional coming and going rule. 
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Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 34A-2-401(l), an employee who is injured by an 
accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, wherever such injury occurred, shall 
be paid compensation. As it is not always clear what actions should be deemed to be "arising out 
of and in the course of employment, however, Utah courts have wisely offered guidelines in 
making this determination. Otherwise, it would be arguable that any action, even those that are 
tangentially related to an employee's work-related duties, would be deemed to be "arising out of 
and in the course of employment. 
In addressing whether an employee traveling to and from work is covered under the 
above-referenced statute, Utah courts have consistently held that "[a]s a general rule, injuries 
sustained by an employee while traveling to and from the place of employment do not arise out 
of and in the course of employment and are, therefore, not covered by workers' compensation. 
VanLeeuwen v. Industrial Comm'n, 901 P.2d 281, 284 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); see also, State Tax 
Comm'n v. Industrial Comm'n, 685 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah 1984); Cross v. Industrial Comm'n, 
814 P.2d 1202, 1204 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). The Court, dealing with issues of equity and 
fairness, held that "it is unfair to impose unlimited liability on an employer for conduct of its 
employees over which it has no control and from which it derives no benefit." VanLeeuwen, 901 
P.2d at 284. Furthermore, while it is critical and beneficial to an employer that his employee 
actually show up for work, "mere arrival at work is not considered a substantial benefit to the 
employer." Id. at 285, see also, Lundberg v. Cream O'Weber, 465 P.2d 175, 176 (Utah 1970). 
In explaining the reasoning behind these holdings, the Utah Supreme Court, quoting 82 
Am. Jur.2d Workers' Compensation § 296 (1992), noted that "[t]his general coming and going 
rule arose because, in most instances, such an injury is suffered as a consequence of risks and 
hazards to which all members of the traveling public are subject rather than risks and hazards 
8 
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having to do with and originating in the work or business of the employer." Drake v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177, 182 (Utah 1997). 
The Commission concluded that "travel was an essential part of [PETITIONER'S] 
employment" and that PETITIONER'S "work-related travel was, therefore, the 'condition' out of 
which his accident and injury arose." (Order Denying Motion for Review, R. 68). Accordingly, 
the Commission determined that "the coming and going rule is inapplicable when the travel 
which gives rise to the accident is an integral part of the work itself." (Order Denying Motion 
for Review, R. 68) The mere fact that the Commission found PETITIONER'S vehicle to be an 
essential part of his employment, however, does not mean that PETITIONER suffered a 
compensable accident. 
The Utah Supreme Court has determined that even though the injured party's vehicle 
may be an essential part of their employment, the use of the employee's vehicle is not 
dispositive. In Whitehead v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company ("VALIC"), 801 P.2d 
934 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court considered whether the employee was acting within 
the course and scope of employment when he was required to use his personal vehicle for 
business purposes. In VALIC, the employee was a district manager and sales person for VALIC. 
Id. at 935. VALIC required him to supervise salesmen and to market annuities and, to this end, 
VALIC provided the employee with an office, telephone, telex machine, and full time office 
personnel. Id. The employee used his personal vehicle "to commute to and from work and for 
sales calls during the day." Id. Additionally, the employee would "occasionally made sales calls 
on his way home and made phone calls to clients from his home." Id. 
On the day of the accident, the employee left his work to return home, where he intended 
to make sales calls. Id. The Court found that the employee had no appointments between his 
9 
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work and his home. Id. On the way home, employee was involved in a motor vehicle accident 
which resulted in serious injuries to the other driver of the vehicle. Id. 
The Court found that the employee worked regular hours, "had a fixed office where the 
bulk of his work was performed . . . [and] frequently left the office for sales calls or meetings . . 
." Id. at 937 Despite these general duties, the Court considered the employee's activities at the 
time of the accident. Id. At the time of the accident, the employee "was not on a sales call, an 
errand, or a special mission for his employer." Id. Furthermore, the Court recognized that at the 
time of the accident VALIC had "no control over [employee] 's decision to commute to and from 
work, the route he chose, or the manner in which he drove his automobile." Id. More 
importantly, the employee's frequent use of his personal vehicle for business purposes did "not 
make VALIC liable for all accidents [petitioner] may be involved in." Id. Accordingly, because 
the employee's activity did not benefit the employer, the Court ruled that the employee was not 
within the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident. 
In this case, as in VALIC, PETITIONER was frequently required to use his vehicle for 
business purposes. (Order Denying Motion for Review, R. 68). The PETITIONER, as in 
VALIC, would often place calls from various locations and was required to travel to various 
business locations. (Order Denying Motion for Review, R. 67). In VALIC, the employee had 
finished conducting some of his employment duties at the office and left for home intending to 
conduct more business telephone calls when he was involved in a car accident. In this case, 
PETITIONER had finished conducting business at his home and was traveling to the Fashion 
Place Mall kiosk intending to work his regularly scheduled shift when he was involved in a car 
accident. (Order Denying Motion for Review, R. 67). In both cases, at the time of the car 
accident neither the VALIC employee nor the PETITIONER were providing a benefit to their 
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respective employers and, therefore, PETITIONER car accident did not occur within the course 
and scope of his employment and the accident is not compensable. 
Similarly, in Lundberg v. Cream O'Weber, 24 Utah 2d 16, 465 P.2d 175 (1970), the Utah 
Supreme Court addressed the fact that an employee was killed on the way to work to attend a 
meeting with company personnel at the company office. Id. at 175. The employee worked with 
and supervised the company's sales personnel. Id. The employee's work "required extensive 
use of an automobile both during and after normal working hours." Id. On the morning of the 
accident, the employee left his house on his way to attend a mandatory meeting at the company 
offices when he was struck and killed by a train. Id. 
In response to the petitioner's claims that the coming and going rule did not apply 
because the employee was traveling to a mandatory meeting, the Court determined that the 
employee must have been performing a duty for the benefit of the employer. In the alternative, 
the Court stated that the employee could also have been performing a duty "so connected with 
his employment as to be an essential part thereof. . ." Id. at 176. Upon this basis, the Court 
determined that the mandatory meeting "was not an unusual occurrence so that traveling to it 
was a special assignment or mission for the employer . . . " Id. 
Likewise, the Court determined that the employee's use of his personal vehicle in going 
to the meeting was not an essential aspect of the business such that it could be regarded as an 
integral part of the business and except his case from the coming and going rule. Id. The Court 
made this determination despite the fact that the employee was required to travel extensively to 
work with and supervise sales representatives and attend mandatory meetings. Accordingly, the 
fact that an employee's car is an integral part of his employment duties is not dispositive. The 
11 
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benefit to the employer must be quantified as well as the employee's purpose for traveling on the 
day of the accident. 
In the instant case, the Commission concluded that PETITIONER'S travel was an 
essential part of his employment and a condition out of which his injury arose. (Order Denying 
Motion for Review, R. 68). The Commission also concluded that PETITIONER'S motor vehicle 
accident occurred while he was rendering a service to his employer or, at the very least, engaged 
in an activity incidental to his employment. (Order Denying Motion for Review, R. 68). The 
Commission's decision was based on its conclusion that PETITIONER'S job duties included a 
"duty to transport merchandise from his home to [RESPONDENTS'] sales locations, to travel 
between the sales locations, and to travel for other business purposes such as depositing sales 
receipts." (Order Denying Motion for Review, R. 68). 
Although the Commission found that PETITIONER'S travel was essential part of his 
employment, the fact that driving is an integral part of an employee's duties is not dispositive. 
Instead, as in Lundberg, the benefits to the employer must be weighed as well as the employee's 
purpose for traveling on the date of the accident. If the travel on the date of the accident was 
routine or not essential to the employee's employment, then the motor vehicle accident is not a 
compensable accident. 
In the instant case, the Commission made a finding of fact that on the date of 
PETITIONER'S motor vehicle accident, PETITIONER drove "to Fashion Place Mall, where he 
planned to work [RESPONDENTS'] sales kiosk." (Order Denying Motion for Review, R. 68). 
PETITIONER was scheduled to work at the Fashion Place Mall kiosk because the person that 
was supposed to have worked that morning had school and could not work that morning. 
(Hearing Transcript, pg. 85 pg 101). PETITIONER was to work the kiosk in the place of the 
12 
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regular employee. [[Regardless of the events that transpired prior to his departure to work at the 
mall kiosk, when he left his home on August 1, 2000, PETITIONER left his house as an 
employee on his way to his scheduled shift.]] 
On the morning of the accident, PETITIONER was traveling to Fashion Place Mall to 
begin a scheduled shift. Again, while it is critical and beneficial to an employer that their 
employee actually show up for work, "mere arrival at work is not considered a substantial benefit 
to the employer." VanLeeuwen v. Indus. Comm'n, 901 P.2d at 285. As a mere employee 
heading to a shift on the morning of the accident there was no substantial benefit to be gained by 
the employer. Accordingly, weighing the reason for PETITIONER'S departure on August 1, 
2000, PETITIONER left for Fashion Place Mall as a scheduled employee to cover a shift at the 
mall kiosk. 
As in Lundberg, PETITIONER was required to arrive at the Fashion Place Mall pursuant 
to his work schedule. Although PETITIONER'S job required him to drive between locations and 
restock product, on the morning of August 1, 2000, PETITIONER left his home as any other 
employee on his way to work. PETITIONER was not running company errands, nor was he on a 
special mission for his employer; instead, he was on his way to work because he was scheduled 
to work at 10:00 a.m. on August 1, 2000. Accordingly, the coming and going rule should be 
applied in this case because the injury suffered was a "consequence of risks and hazards to which 
all members of the traveling public are subject rather than risks and hazards having to do with 
and originating in the work or business of the employer." Drake v. Industrial Comm'n, 939 P.2d 
177, 182 (Utah 1997). 
Likewise, in VanLeeuwen v. Industrial Commission, 901 P.2d 281 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), 
the Utah Court of Appeals similarly held that the employee's injuries did not arise out of and in 
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the course of employment. Id. at 285. In VanLeeuwen, the employee sustained injuries in an 
automobile accident while driving from his home to the business office. Id. at 283. The injured 
employee was a "Project Supervisor" responsible for "supervising other employees and for 
transporting them to and from various worksites." Id. The employee was provided a company 
truck to carry out his job duties at the various cites he was required to oversee. Id. 
The Utah Court of Appeals determined that "as a general rule, injuries sustained by an 
employee while traveling to and from the place of employment do not arise out of and in the 
course of employment and are, therefore, not covered by workers' compensation." Id. at 284. 
The Court determined that the employee "was not performing any service arising out of and in 
the course of his employment on the morning of the accident." Id. at 285 (emphasis added). 
Moreover, "at the time of the accident, [the employee] was merely traveling to work . . . [h]e had 
not yet arrived at work to receive his daily assignments after which he would be under the 
control of [the employer]." Id. (emphasis added). Finally, the Court concluded that the 
employer's "control over [the employee] was no greater than its control over any other employee 
traveling to and from work." Id. 
In this case, as in VanLeeuwen, PETITIONER'S vehicle was a necessary tool to his 
employment. Instead of transporting men iErom various job locations, PETITIONER transported 
merchandise to the various store locations, traveled between store locations, and traveled for 
other business purposes such as depositing sales receipts. (Order Denying Motion for Review, 
R. 68). As in VanLeeuwen, PETITIONER regularly traveled between his home and the various 
store locations as a regular job duty. On the morning of the accident, however, PETITIONER'S 
situation is strikingly similar to the petitioner in VanLeeuwen, 
14 
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In VanLeeuwen, the petitioner was on his way from his home to an office location to 
receive instructions for the day; PETITIONER was on his way from his home to his business 
kiosk as a regular employee with a regular shift. The Court made the distinction between what 
the petitioner's regular job duties were and what the petitioner was doing on the morning of the 
accident. No such distinction was made by the Commission. (Order Denying Motion for 
Review, R. 66-69). The Commission noted that the coming and going rule applies to employees 
having fixed hours and place of work and that the coming and going rule is covered only on the 
employer's premises. (Order Denying Motion for Review n.l, R.68). On the morning of the 
accident, however, PETITIONER left his home because he had a set schedule and a time to work 
at the Fashion Place Mall kiosk and, therefore, the coming and going rule should apply in this 
case. 
In this case, the Commission determined that the coming and going rule did not apply 
based on the Commission's findings that PETITIONER would deliver merchandise he received 
at his home to the various mall locations. (Order Denying Motion for Review, R. 67). The 
Commission found that RESPONDENTS had provided PETITIONER with a computer for his 
home to do scheduling and to generate reports. (Order Denying Motion for Review, R. 67). The 
Commission also found that RESPONDENTS had provided him with a cell phone for business 
uses while traveling between his home and the various mall locations. (Order Denying Motion 
for Review, R. 67). Similarly, the Commission found that PETITIONER 
customarily began work at his home at approximately 8 a.m. . . . [h]e would first perform 
work on his computer, then call the employees scheduled to work that day . . . [a]t about 
9:00 a.m., he would leave his home in the Tooele area and drive to one of 
[RESPONDENTS'] sales locations in the Salt Lake Valley. 
(Order Denying Motion for Review, R. 67). 
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Based upon PETITIONER'S work from home prior to his leaving to his scheduled shift at 
the Fashion Place Mall kiosk, the Commission concluded that PETITIONER was "rendering a 
service to his employer, or at the very least was engaged in an activity that was necessarily 
incidental to his employment." (Order Denying Motion for Review, R. 68). Based on the 
findings of fact, the Commission determined that on the morning of the accident PETITIONER 
had logged on to his computer at 7:30 a.m., while his accident occurred at 9:47 a.m. Based upon 
these facts, the Commission determined that the coming and going rule did not apply and 
workers' compensation benefits were to be paid. (Order Denying Motion for Review, R. 69). 
With respect to the use of the computer, even if it was used for employment purposes and 
the PETITIONER actually made work-related phone calls that morning, these actions are hardly 
sufficient to conclude that he was at work when he later departed for the mall. To allow such 
limited actions to constitute the beginning of the work day for purposes of determining whether 
the employee was within the course and scope of his employment with respect to workers' 
compensation coverage would have far reaching and negative consequences. 
In this day, it is becomingly increasingly rare to find an individual, let alone a business 
person, without a cell phone. Add to that, the large number of people who carry a palm pilot or a 
lap top computer and you have a population that is largely wired together and to their places of 
employment. These connections are necessary due to realities of modern business which often 
requires communication between employee and employer at any given time. While this 
technology has made communication easy and almost instantaneous, it has also blurred the line 
between when we are at work and when we are outside the control of employers. 
Cellular phone calls from clients, co-workers and bosses frequently occur outside of 
"normal" work hours. E-mails are sent and checked on lap tops, by text messaging on phones 
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and through palm pilots at all hours of the day and night. In fact, staying connected has become 
so important that even shopping malls now have internet kiosks where our e-mails can be 
checked and responded to while we shop. 
Under the reasoning of this case, each time an employee calls ahead to his secretary he is 
at work. Each time an email from an employer is checked at a mall kiosk, that person is at work. 
Each time an employee sits at his breakfast table and updates his palm pilot with a list of duties 
that need to be performed that day, he is at work. Then, if any of these people, pursuant to this 
holding, get in an accident on their drive to the office, they are within the course and scope of 
their employment. 
For many companies, this would mean that their employees now have almost around the 
clock workers' compensation coverage. Even though the benefit to the employer may be 
minimal and the control over the employee is virtually nonexistent, these communications that 
are so necessary in the modern workplace would be within the course and scope of employment 
and would be covered under workers1 compensation. The effects of this blanket coverage would 
be chilling to the Utah business climate. 
Employers would think twice before making any type of communication with their 
employees away from the office. Important deals, decisions that need to be made immediately 
and opportunities would have to be bypassed or delayed so as to not expose the employer to 
significant liability without any corresponding control over the employees' actions. Such 
limitations certainly go beyond the scope and design of the workers' compensation system. 
In sum, the Commission concluded that workers' compensation benefits were owed 
because PETITIONER'S duties included a "duty to transport merchandise from his home to 
[RESPONDENTS'] sales locations, to travel between sales locations, and to travel for other 
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business purposes such as depositing sales receipts." (Order Denying Motion for Review, R. 
68). Upon this basis, the Commission concluded that PETITIONER'S accident occurred within 
the course and scope of his employment and, consequently, was a compensable accident. (Order 
Denying Motion for Review, R. 69). 
Based upon PETITIONER making one entry on the family home computer two hours 
prior to his departure for his scheduled shift and the PETITIONER'S general duties, the 
Commission concluded that PETITIONER'S work-related travel was a condition out of which 
his accident arose. (Order Denying Motion for Review, R. 68). The Commission also concluded 
that PETITIONER'S accident "occurred while he was rendering a service to his employer, or at 
the very least was engaged in an activity that was necessarily incidental to his employment," 
which was based on PETITIONER'S activities prior to leaving his home. (Order Denying 
Motion for Review, R. 68). The Commission considered PETITIONER'S overall job duties and 
early morning activity, but did not consider PETITIONER'S activity at the time he left his home 
for his regularly scheduled shift on the morning of the accident. 
On the morning of the accident, PETITIONER was scheduled to work a shift at the 
Fashion Place Mall kiosk. (Hearing Transcript, R. 74, Page 85, Line 10 through Line 20). 
Although PETITIONER had made an entry on his family home computer, this entry was made at 
7:30 a.m. (Order Denying Motion for Review, R. 67). When PETITIONER left his home for 
the Fashion Place Mall kiosk, PETITIONIER was going to the Fashion Place Mall kiosk as any 
other employee would when they were scheduled to open that particular location. (Hearing 
Transcript, R. 74, Page 93, Line 24 through Page 94, Line 4). Moreover, it should be noted that 
RESPONDENTS had no control over PETITIONER'S decision to commute to and from work, 
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the route he chose, or the manner in which PETITIONER drove his vehicle. (Hearing 
Transcript, R. 74, Page 93, Line 4 through Page 94, Line 4). 
The Commission based the award of workers' compensation benefits on PETITIONER'S 
overall job duties rather than what the PETITIONER was scheduled to do at the time he left his 
home on the morning of the accident. Consequently, benefits should be denied based on the 
coming and going rule as PETITIONER was merely traveling from his home to his scheduled 
shift at the Fashion Place Mall kiosk, which is not within the course and scope of his 
employment. 
CONCLUSION 
Although PETITIONER made an entry on his home computer and may have conducted 
other business activity, the fact remains that when he left his home in Tooele he was leaving his 
home to attend his regularly scheduled shift at the Fashion Place Mall kiosk. RESPONDENTS 
neither had control over PETITIONER nor received any benefit from his arrival at work. 
Consequently, the RESPONDENTS respectfully request this Court reverse the Commission's 
Order Denying Motion for Review and deny the award of workers' compensation benefits under 
the coming and going rule. 
DATED THIS Zf day of May, 2004. 
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
Attorneys for Respondents/Appellants 
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ADDENDUM 
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(l 1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, an addendum in 
included herewith. 
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78-2-7 JUDICIAL CODE 546 
78-2-7. Repealed. 1986 
78-2-7.5. Service of sheriff to court. 
The court may at any time require the attendance and 
services of any sheriff in the state. 1988 
78-2-8 to 78-2-14. Repealed. 1986,1988 
CHAPTER 2a 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Section 
78-2a-l. Creation — Seal. 
78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Functions — 
Filing fees. 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
78-2a-4. Review of actions by Supreme Court. 
78-2a-5. Location of Court of Appeals. 
78-2a-6. Appellate Mediation Office — Protected records 
and information — Governmental immunity. 
78-2a-l. Creation — Seal. 
There is created a court known as the Court of Appeals. The 
Court of Appeals is a court of record and shall have a seal. 
1986 
78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Functions — 
Fil ing fees. 
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges. The term 
of appointment to office as a judge of the Court of Appeals is 
until the first general election held more than three years 
after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter, the 
term of office of a judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and 
commences on the first Monday in January, next following the 
date of election. A judge whose term expires may serve, upon 
request of the Judicial Council, until a successor is appointed 
and qualified. The presiding judge of the Court of Appeals 
shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per annum or 
fraction thereof for the period served. 
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment in 
panels of three judges. Assignment to panels shall be by 
random rotation of all judges of the Court of Appeals. The 
Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection of a 
chair for each panel. The Court of Appeals may not sit en banc. 
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a presid-
ing judge from among the members of the court by majority 
vote of all judges. The term of office of the presiding judge is 
two years and until a successor is elected. A presiding judge of 
the Court of Appeals may serve in that office no more than two 
successive terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for 
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or incapacity 
of the presiding judge. 
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of 
presiding judge by majority vote of all judges of the Court of 
Appeals. In addition to the duties of a judge of the Court of 
Appeals, the presiding judge shall: 
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels; 
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court; 
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of 
Appeals; and 
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court 
and the Judicial Council. 
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for 
the Supreme Court. 1988 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all ex-
traordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and de-
crees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, includ-
ing jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from 
the district court review of informal adjudicative proceed-
ings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commis-
sion, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional 
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire 
and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive direc-
tor of the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, 
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political 
subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 
63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in 
criminal cases, except those involving a charge of a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a conviction or charge of a first 
degree felony or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary 
writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving 
any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting 
a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordi-
nary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of 
Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic rela-
tions cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, annul-
ment, property division, child custody, support, parent-
time, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the 
Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by 
the vote of four judges of the court may certify to the Supreme 
Court for original appellate review and determination any 
matter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate 
jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the require-
ments of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures 
Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 2001 
78-2a-4. Review of act ions by Supreme Court. 
Review of the judgments, orders, and decrees of the Court of 
Appeals shall be by petition for writ of certiorari to the 
Supreme Court. 1986 
78-2a-5. Location of Court of Appeals. 
The Court of Appeals has its principal location in Salt Lake 
City. The Court of Appeals may perform any of its functions in 
any location within the state. 1986 
78-2a-6. Appellate Mediation Office — Protected 
records and information — Governmental ini" 
munity. 
(1) Unless a more restrictive rule of court is adopted pur-
suant to Subsection 63-2-201(3)(b), information and records 
relating to any matter on appeal received or generated by the 
Chief Appellate Mediator or other staff of the Appellate 
Mediation Office as a result of any party's participation or lack 
of participation in the settlement program shall be main-
tained as protected records pursuant to Subsections 63-2-
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34A-2-401 UTAH LABOR CODE 490 
(c) (i) Except as provided in Subsections (4)(c)(ii) and 
(iii), if a chemical test that creates the presumption 
under Subsection (4)(a) is taken at the request of the 
employer, the employer shall comply with: 
(A) Title 34, Chapter 38, Drug and Alcohol 
Testing; or 
(B) if the employee is a local governmental 
employee or an employee of a state institution of 
higher education, Title 34, Chapter 41, Local 
Governmental Entity Drug-Free Workplace Pol-
icies. 
(ii) Notwithstanding Section 34-38-13, the results 
of a test taken under Title 34, Chapter 38, may be 
disclosed to the extent necessary to establish or rebut 
the presumption created under Subsection (4)(a). 
(iii) Notwithstanding Section 34-41-103, the re-
sults of a test taken under Title 34, Chapter 41, may 
be disclosed to the extent necessary to establish or 
rebut the presumption created under Subsection 
(4)(a). 
(5) If any provision of this section, or the application of any 
provision of this section to any person or circumstance, is held 
invalid, the remainder of this section shall be given effect 
without the invalid provision or application. 2000 
PART 4 
COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS 
34A-2-401. Compensa t ion for i ndus t r i a l acc iden t s to 
be pa id . 
(1) An employee described in Section 34A-2-104 who is 
injured and the dependents of each such employee who is 
killed, by accident arising out of and in the course of the 
employee's employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the 
accident was not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid: 
(a) compensation for loss sustained on account of the 
injury or death; 
(b) the amount provided in this chapter for: 
(i) medical, nurse, and hospital services; 
(ii) medicines; and 
(iii) in case of death, the amount of funeral ex-
penses. 
(2) The responsibility for compensation and payment of 
medical, nursing, and hospital services and medicines, and 
funeral expenses provided under this chapter shall be: 
(a) on the employer and the employer's insurance car-
rier; and 
(b) not on the employee. 
(3) Payment of benefits provided by this chapter or Chapter 
3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, shall commence within 30 
calendar days after any final award by the commission. 1999 
34A-2-402. Menta l s t r ess c la ims. 
(1) Physical, mental, or emotional injuries related to men-
tal stress arising out of and in the course of employment shall 
be compensable under this chapter only when there is a 
sufficient legal and medical causal connection between the 
employee's injury and employment. 
(2) (a) Legal causation requires proof of extraordinary 
mental stress from a sudden stimulus arising predomi-
nantly and directly from employment. 
(b) The extraordinary and sudden nature of the alleged 
mental stress is judged according to an objective standard 
in comparison with contemporary national employment 
and nonemployment life. 
(3) Medical causation requires proof that the physical, 
mental, or emotional injury was medically caused by the 
mental stress that is the legal cause of the physical, mental, or 
emotional injury. 
(4) Good faith employer personnel actions including disci-
plinary actions, work evaluations, job transfers, layoffs, demo-
tions, promotions, terminations, or retirements, may not form 
the basis of compensable mental stress claims under this 
chapter. 
(5) Alleged discrimination, harassment, or unfair labor 
practices otherwise actionable at law may not form the basis of 
compensable mental stress claims under this chapter. 
(6) An employee who alleges a compensable industrial 
accident involving mental stress bears the burden of proof to 
establish legal and medical causation by a preponderance of 
the evidence. 1997 
34A-2-403. Dependents — Presumption. 
(1) The following persons shall be presumed to be wholly 
dependent for support upon a deceased employee: 
(a) a child under 18 years of age, or over if the child is 
physically or mentally incapacitated and dependent upon 
the parent, with whom the child is living at the time of the 
death of the parent, or who is legally bound for the child's 
support; and 
(b) for purposes of payments to be made under Subsec-
tion 34A-2-702(5)(a)(i), a surviving spouse with whom the 
deceased employee lived at the time of the employee's 
death. 
(2) (a) In a case not provided for in Subsection (1), the 
question of dependency, in whole or in part, shall be 
determined in accordance with the facts in each particu-
lar case existing at the time of the injury or death of an 
employee, except for purposes of dependency reviews 
under Subsection 34A-2-702(5)(a)(iv). 
(b) A person may not be considered as a dependent 
unless that person is: 
(i) a member of the family of the deceased em-
ployee; 
(ii) the spouse of the deceased employee; 
(iii) a lineal descendant or ancestor of the deceased 
employee; or 
(iv) brother or sister of the deceased employee. 
(3) As used in this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupa-
tional Disease Act: 
(a) "brother or sister" includes a half brother or sister; 
and 
(b) "child" includes: 
(i) a posthumous child; or 
(ii) a child legally adopted prior to the injury. 1997 
34A-2-404. Injuries to minors. 
(1) A minor is considered sui juris for the purposes of this 
chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, and 
no other person shall have any cause of action or right to 
compensation for an injury to the minor employee. 
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), in the event of the 
award of a lump sum of compensation to a minor employee, 
the sum shall be paid only to the minor's legally appointed 
guardian. 1997 
34A-2-405. Employee injured outside state — Entitled 
to compensation — Limitation of time. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), if an employee who 
has been hired or is regularly employed in this state receives 
personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of 
employment outside of this state, the employee, or the employ-
ee's dependents in case of the employee's death, shall be 
entitled to compensation according to the law of this state. 
(2) This section applies only to those injuries received by 
the employee within six months after leaving this state, unless 
prior to the expiration of the six-month period the employer 
has filed with the division notice that the employer has elected 
to extend such coverage a greater period of time. l907 
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
ORDER DENYING 
MOTION FOR REVIEW 
Case No. 00-0807 
Aqua Massage, LLC, and its workers' compensation insurance carrier, Hartford / Twin City 
re Insurance (jointly referred to as "Aqua") ask the Utah Labor Commission to review 
iministrative Law Judge George's award of benefits to Robert Higgins under the Utah Workers' 
Dmpensation Act ("the Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Ann.). 
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah 
3de Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801(3) and Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1.M. 
BACKGROUND AND ISSUE PRESENTED 
On September 8, 2000, an Application For Hearing was filed with the Commission on Mr. 
iggins' behalf to compel Aqua to pay workers' compensation benefits for injuries Mr. Higgins 
istained in an automobile accident on August 1,2000. On June 11,2001, Judge George conducted 
l evidentiary hearing on Mr. Higgins' claim, Then, on June 17, 2003, Judge George issued his 
vision concluding that Mr. Higgins' injuries were work-related and therefore compensable under 
e Act. 
Aqua now requests Commission review of Judge George's decision. In its motion for 
:view, Aqua argues that Mr. Higgins is not entitled to workers' compensation benefits because his 
juries are not work-related. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Commission adopts Judge George's findings of fact, which can be summarized as 
)llows. 
On August 1,2000, Mr. Higgins was employed as assistant manager of Aqua Massage LLC, 
small company that sells hydro-massage products from kiosks located in Fashion Place, 
Cottonwood and Crossroads malls. 
)BERT HIGGINS, * 
Applicant, 
* 
* 
3UA MASSAGE, LLC * 
d HARTFORD/TWIN * 
Defendants. * 
TY FIRE INSURANCE, 
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)RDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW 
ROBERT HIGGINS 
AGE 2 
As assistant manager, Mr. Higgins was expected to take whatever action was necessary to 
lake Aqua's retail operations run smoothly. He established employee work schedules and called 
nployees from his home to verify they would report for work. From time to time, he worked at the 
arious sales kiosks himself, as necessary to cover for absent employees. He collected employee 
me cards, tracked inventory, and collected and deposited sales receipts. 
Merchandise intended for sale at Aqua's kiosks was delivered to Mr. Higgins' home, where 
was stored until needed. Mr. Higgins would then deliver the merchandise to the various kiosks, 
qua provided Mr. Higgins with a computer at his home for use in scheduling and generating 
ports. Mr. Higgins used his personal vehicle for his work-related travel. The company provided 
m with a cell phone to maintain contact as he moved between his home and the various sales 
cations. 
Mr. Higgins customarily began work at his home at approximately 8 a.m. He would first 
rform work on his computer, then call the employees scheduled to work that day. At about 9 a.m., 
would leave his home in the Tooele area and drive to one of Aqua's sales locations in the Salt 
ke valley. 
On August 1, 2000, Mr. Higgins was seriously injured in an automobile accident. Due to 
uma from the accident, he cannot recall any of the events of that day. However, the evidence 
ablishes that during the morning before the accident, he followed his regular work routine by 
;ging on to his computer at home at 7:30 a.m., then driving to Fashion Place mall, where he 
mned to work Aqua's sales kiosk. Mr. Higgins' accident occurred at 9:47 a.m., as he was 
broaching the mall. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW 
Section 34A-2-401(l) of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act provides that "(e)ach 
ployee... injured... by accident arising out of and in the course of the employee's employment, 
erever such injury occurred, . . . shall be paid compensation . . . and medical . . . expenses, as 
vided by this chapter." It is undisputed that Mr. Higgins: 1) was employed by Aqua; 2) was 
ired by accident on August 1, 2000; and 3) incurred medical expenses and suffered disability as 
suit of his injury. Consequently, it is only necessary for Mr. Higgins to show by a preponderance 
he evidence that his injury "arose out of and in the course o f his work for Aqua in order to 
lify for the benefits provided by the Act. 
In Buczvnski v. Industrial Commission, 934 P.2d 1169, 1172 (Utah App. 1997), the Utah 
irt of Appeals discussed the meaning of the terms "arising out of employment" and "arising in 
course of employment": 
Under Utah law, an accident occurs "in the course" of employment when it 
"occurs while the employee is rendering service to his employer which he was hired 
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*DER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW 
3BERT HIGGINS 
U5E3 
to do or doing something incidental thereto, at the time when and the place where he 
was authorized to render such service." M & K Corp. v. Industrial Common, 112 
Utah 488 493,189 P.2d 132,134 (1948). 
An accident arises out of employment "when there is a 'causal relationship' 
between the injury and the employment." Commercial Carriers v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 888 P.2d707,712 (UtahCt. App. 1994) (QuotingM&KCorp. 112 Utah 
493,189 P.2d at 134), cert, denied, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995). "'Arising out of,'" 
however, does not mean that the accident must be "'caused by'" the employment; 
rather the employment '"is thought of more as a condition out of which the event 
arises than as the force producing the event in affirmative fashion.'" Commercial 
Carriers, 888 P.2d at 712 (quoting 1 Arthur Larson, The Law of Workmen's 
Compensation §6.60, at 3-9 (1994)) (emphasis in quoted treatise). 
With respect to Mr. Higgins' claim, the Commission concludes that travel was an essential 
art of Mr. Higgins' employment. It was Mr. Higgins' duty to transport merchandise from his home 
) Aqua's sales locations, to travel between the sales locations, and to travel for other business 
urposes such as depositing sales receipts. Mr. Higgins' work-related travel was, therefore, the 
condition" out of which his accident and injury arose. Furthermore, Mr. Higgins' automobile 
ccident occurred while he was rendering a service to his employer, or at the very least was engaged 
n an activity that was necessarily incidental to his employment. In light of the foregoing, the 
Commission concludes that Mr. Higgins' injury arose out of and in the course of his employment 
it Aqua. 
The Commission notes Aqua's argument that the "coming and going rule"1 should apply to 
)ar Mr. Higgins' claim. However, the coming and going rule is inapplicable when the travel which 
*ives rise to the accident is an integral part of the work itself. The Commission also notes Aqua's 
irgument that an award of benefits in this case will require payment of workers' compensation 
benefits in future cases whenever a worker has an accident while using a home compute, cell phone 
or electronic calendar for any business-related purpose. Aqua's argument in this regard is 
speculative. Rather than addressing hypothetical situations, the Commission must apply the well-
established principles of Utah's workers' compensation law to the existing facts of Mr. Higgins' 
present claim. 
Professor Larson states the "coming and going rule" as follows:"... for an employee 
having fixed hours and place of work, going to and from work is covered only on the 
employer's premises. (Citations omitted.) See Larson's Workers' Compensation 
Law, Vol. 1, §13.01. 
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In summary, the Commission concurs with Judge George's determination that Mr. Higgins 
uffered injuries by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment at Aqua and is, 
herefore, entitled to workers' compensation benefits for those injuries. 
ORDER 
The Commission affirms Judge George's decision and denies Aqua's motion for review. It 
> so ordered. 
Dated this [Q day of November, 2003. 
Utah Labor Commissioner 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Labor Commission to reconsider this Order. Any such request for 
consideration must be received by the Labor Commission within 20 days of the date of this order, 
lternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for 
view with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days 
*the date of this order. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion For Review in the matter of 
ert Higgins, Case No. 00-0807, was mailed first class postage prepaid this ^ / d a y of 
ember, 2003, to the following: 
3ERT HIGGINS 
\ RIVER ROAD #24 
3EORGE UT 84790 
UA MASSAGE LLC 
SDOUGLAS ST#1 
.T LAKE CITY UT 84102 
RTFORD / TWIN CITY FIRE INSURANCE 
i BOX 22815 
NVER CO 80222 
)AWN ATKIN, ATTORNEY 
KIN & ASSOCIATES 
. SOUTH STATE #380 
LT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
D KANELL, ATTORNEY 
ANT WALLACE CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
5 SOUTH TEMPLE #1700 
LT LAKE CITY UT 84111-1131 
| 
N&Mid&ft^* 
Sara Danielson 
Support Specialist 
Utah Labor Commission 
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